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Feeling Good and Financing Impact: Affective 
Judgments as a Tool for Social Investing 
Jacob Hellman ∗ 
Abstract: »Sich gut fühlen und finanzielle Wirkung erzielen: Affektive Urteile 
als Instrument für soziale Investitionen«. This article analyzes how moralized 
repertoires get linked to affective judgments to form the early-stage social im-
pact investor, a financial subject who invests in startups for both profit and 
positive social impact. It draws on interviews with and observations of investors 
in San Diego, California. The financialization of social activities generally pro-
ceeds by quantification and commensuration. However, for startups, nothing 
yet exists to quantify. Instead, investors narrate ethical conversions, and evalu-
ate through affective knowing and encounters with entrepreneurs. Simultane-
ously, they draw on financial skills, technologies, and disciplines to grow these 
startups. Startups must soon quantify their social impact to attract bigger in-
vestors, suggesting how affective and moralized forms of relation may persist, 
even when subsumed within larger financial flows governed by quantified rea-
soning. 
Keywords: Social impact investing, Financialization, angel investing, affect, 
quantification, United States, social value. 
1. Introduction 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, as owners and stewards of capital increas-
ingly wish to deploy their hoards1 in ways consonant with their environmental 
and social values (Deloitte 2016), a new constellation of financial practices has 
coalesced under the mantle of impact investing. The term refers to the financ-
ing of ventures which generate both profit and social value, or impact. This 
article analyzes how moralized repertoires get linked to affective judgments to 
produce the early-stage social impact investor, a particular variant of this fi-
nancial type. Most impact investing happens within the domain of institutional 
finance, e.g., large, professionally managed pension and private equity funds. 
There, what counts as “impact” is determined by diverse and disparate rating 
and ranking systems. A robust literature on market devices has detailed these 
 
∗  Jacob Hellman, Department of Communication, University of California San Diego; La Jolla, 
CA 92093, United States; jhellman@uscd.edu. 
1  “Money,” when not circulating, becomes “petrified into a hoard” (Marx 1976 [1967], 228). 
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processes of abstraction, demonstrating how they borrow forms of expertise 
from finance in order to quantify the social value, or impact, produced by or-
ganizations and businesses (Barman 2016; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017; 
Archer 2019). Such scholarship has demonstrated how social activities previ-
ously funded by governments and NGOs are being opened to mediation by 
profit-seeking financial actors, through the rating and measuring of social im-
pact produced. These studies have focused on institutional finance, a key re-
search site given the concentration of capital there, and also given these stud-
ies’ disciplinary roots in the sociology of scientific knowledge: techniques of 
quantifying, modeling, and abstracting in high finance resemble those of the 
laboratory. But in a less elite corner of finance, a set of individual investors in 
“startups” (early-stage companies pursuing rapid growth) are taking a distinct 
approach to what they, too, call impact investing. Here, because entrepreneurial 
ventures are nascent and possess nothing to quantify, these early-stage inves-
tors have classically relied on their “gut” – an affective way of knowing rooted 
in an unacknowledged class habitus (cf. Bourdieu 1990) – to judge and value 
conventional (non-impact) startups. As the vogue for impact investing trickles 
down from institutional finance, these investors continue to rely on their affec-
tive forms of judging, belying scholarly accounts of the quantified and statisti-
cal logics colonizing non-financial domains (Fourcade 2011, Chiapello 2015). 
Numbers and feelings, surely, are not contradictory categories for the social 
studies of finance. Emotions, for example, lubricate financial transactions un-
der conditions of fundamental uncertainty (Pixley 2002); affect imbues appar-
ently numerical calculation to stabilize markets (Zaloom 2009). But for the 
financial actors examined below, affect and its embodiment are explicit tools to 
sense and judge social value, rather than the unacknowledged underpinnings of 
an allegedly rational financial calculus. This article contributes to the under-
standing of financialization by analyzing how emotional sense-making can 
serve as an overture to capitalizing new domain through the norms and tech-
niques of venture capital. 
Social impact rating systems such as the Impact Report Investment Stand-
ards (IRIS) aim to help construct the impact investment market by commensu-
rating qualitatively different social impacts, thereby “allowing investors to 
engage in comparison across firms and funds” (Barman 2015, 30). The “inves-
tor” imagined here by practitioners and critical scholars alike is of a particular 
type. It may refer to the “retail” impact investor – as yet more aspirational than 
widespread – an individual who scrutinizes numerical ratings in glossy reports 
advertising social impact funds, just as she would compare interest rates on 
conventional investments. Or it may refer to a professional fund manager, 
selecting corporate securities to accord with preferences of socially concerned 
clients. In both cases, the investment relation is thickly mediated by institution-
al finance, rendering the investment an unencumbered and abstract market 
transaction. But consider Robert, a retired city planner in California who calls 
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himself an impact investor, and has purchased equity in a Rwandan startup 
attempting to profitably turn human waste into biofuel. Robert scouted out this 
and similar investment deals himself, meets with the entrepreneurs, and moni-
tors their growth. Unlike institutional impact actors, he knows impact viscerally 
when he sees it, and numbers do not aid his judgment. 
The impact metric, then, functions not only as a commensuration device but 
also a “technology of distance,” representing claims to social impact without 
the need for “intimate knowledge and personal trust” (Porter 1995, ix). When 
private equity firm TPG launched a $2 billion impact fund called “Rise” which 
uses a proprietary rating system, board member and musician-activist Bono 
emphasized its “rigor of metrics,” contrasting this with “warm fuzzy feelings” 
guiding other impact investors (Sorkin 2016). Certainly, practicality is a factor 
here: it would be difficult for TPG, an institutional investor, to evaluate inves-
tees in the face-to-face manner of Robert, on such a large scale. One might 
therefore dismiss early-stage investors like Robert and others this article will 
examine as inconsequential for an analysis of the financialization of social 
activities: for one, the startups in which they invest lack a history (or “track 
record”) of producing social impact to measure, and secondly, metrics and their 
corollary mode of mathematical reasoning are tools suited for larger securities 
traded on global financial markets, and not for startups, which are illiquid and 
long-term investments. Furthermore, financialization is understood as the turn-
ing of things – whether scientific knowledge or social activities – into tradable 
assets valued specifically through future-weighted modeling of risk and reve-
nue (Birch 2016). Tackling social problems by funding startups, then, may 
seem more indicative of governments channelling civic aspirations into entre-
preneurship (Irani 2019) than of an incursion by mathematically-based high 
finance. But it is the premise of this article that financialization, as a society-
wide process, can manifest in unexpected forms in particular contexts. The 
affective approaches to small investing described below, I argue, arise as a 
distinct moment, or stage, within the broader process of financialization – a 
process which is only more easily visible in “colonies” of quantified reasoning 
and securitization (Chiapello 2015). 
The claim that “financialization” constitutively encompasses moments in 
which financial markets and quantified reasoning are not immediately present 
hinges, for this article, on the diachronic and developmental logic of startup 
fundraising. Early stage investors do not purchase equity (company ownership; 
stock) to reap small annual dividends from operating profits. Rather, they hope 
to rapidly grow and then sell startups, generating order-of-magnitude returns. 
Impact startups hope, additionally, to generate large-scale social value that can 
be quantified and rated – thereby making themselves legible, and desirable, to 
institutional funds like TPG Rise. This imperative to pursue growth and even-
tual quantifiability is felt by a small impact fund in San Diego, which has in-
vested several million dollars in three startups there. At present, its director, 
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Naomi, can secure $50k investments from local individuals “after a twenty-
minute conversation.” But to grow, she plans to seek capital from institutional 
funds, and for that she understands that she must implement impact metrics. “If 
I could sell them on my own judgments calls, I would,” she says, “but that only 
works for people who’ve known me for years.” And institutional investors are 
interested in capitalizing these smaller entities as they grow, because the impact 
market, according to the Rockefeller Foundation, faces “a shortage of opportu-
nities to invest […] and lack of innovate deal structure” (cited in Chiapello and 
Godefroy 2017, 166). The depth of financialization as “morphological trans-
formation” of economies (Chiapello 2015) is revealed, therefore, in how fi-
nance allows affective and face-to-face forms of relation to persist, even as it 
subsumes them within larger capital flows governed by quantified reasoning. 
This article illustrates how a particular type of social investment is advanced 
through sense-making which relies on emotions rather than quantified indica-
tors. Even classical financial devices, it shows, can be employed within an 
affective frame. I first introduce the setting and approach to data collection. In 
section two, I present proponents’ rationale for impact metrics as a device 
facilitating financial markets, and show why metrics do not work for early-
stage investment. I then show how, in lieu of metrics, individuals narrate an 
experience of ethical “conversion” to impact investing. Following this change, 
I demonstrate, they assess social impact through embodied affect, a mode of 
sense-making embedded in a community of practice. Section three demon-
strates that from within this new identity and practice, impact investors unprob-
lematically continue to enact their previous professional habitus oriented to-
ward financial growth. To do so, they rely on investment techniques borrowed 
from conventional venture capital, such as financial due diligence and equity-
based contracts. Finally, I show how they derive satisfaction by imposing en-
trepreneurial disciplines on their investees and even on some fellow investors, 
performing the boundary between impact investing and (un-financialized) 
philanthropy. 
1.2  Setting and Methodology 
Given the face-to-face basis of much early-stage investment work, this study 
relies on field observations when possible. Like ethnographies of investment 
banks (cf. Ho 2009, Ortiz 2014), it attends to the way that financial techniques 
and theories become incorporated, so to speak, in bodies, emotions, and disci-
plines. The study also draws on close readings of subjects’ narratives gleaned 
from interviews, as well as from their public presentations and published texts. 
I focus on San Diego, California, where impact proponents are working to 
build an “ecosystem” (as they call it) populated not only with investors and 
entrepreneurs, but also financial lawyers, wealth managers, tax advisors, and 
non-profit organizations willing to collaborate with private capital. This mid-
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sized city affords a manageable scale for this study. I attended six presentations 
and networking events, and conducted fourteen interviews ranging from one 
half to two hours, between 2016 to 2018. I contextualize the data I gathered 
with analysis of recorded presentations from the leading U.S. impact investing 
conference, SoCap (Social Capital Markets), from 2014 to 2017.  
Because the impact field is new, no purebred impact investors yet exist. 
Many have professional backgrounds in conventional finance. Four informants 
profiled below I classify as early-stage impact investors (see Table 1a). Qua 
“early-stage,” their practice models itself on institutional venture capital (VC): 
on its financial strategy (rapidly growing risky startups), its language and ethos 
(enthusiastic and optimistic), and its devices (gut judgments, speculative valua-
tions). Qua “social impact,” this label is self-applied by them. Academic at-
tempts to pin down the definition of impact investing (Höchstädter et al. 2015) 
yield only an inventory of practitioners’ idiosyncratic meanings. Practitioners, 
meanwhile, unconcerned with essences, characterize impact as a spectrum: 
extending from maximum impact with low financial return – termed conces-
sionary capital – to lower impact with higher return. The investors I examine 
occupy different locations on this spectrum. All have come to the practice 
because they find it meaningful, and because they have a ready-to-hand profes-
sional skill set. They hold in common the belief that they can do social good – 
however defined – by funding nascent businesses with their own capital. Three 
other informants have founded or manage intermediary organizations working 
to grow impact investing in San Diego (see Table 1b). Finally, I draw on inter-
views with managers of two small impact investment funds, or “boutique 
shops” (see Table 1c). Technically, these are institutional investors, managing 
others’ money, but their scale of operation aligns with the independent inves-
tors on whom I focus. These various individuals will be introduced in turn 
below, but I provide a summary table here. 
Early-stage investors, both impact and conventional, frequently call them-
selves “angel investors” or “business angels.” I discard that label here to avoid 
confusion: “angel” does not connote altruism, and is not inherently linked to 
social investing.2 The term has long been used in conventional for-profit invest-
ing, and marks two key characteristics. First, early-stage or angel investors 
supply the initial capital into nascent entities sometimes consisting of only an 
entrepreneur and an idea. Second, unlike VCs, they invest their own money. As 
such, angels are considered non-professional investors: they lack fiduciary 
obligations – the U.S. legal requirement for entities investing others’ money to 
maximize profits – and thus need not justify their decisions to any other parties. 
Furthermore, they deploy relatively small sums of money and are generally 
 
2  “Angel investor” originally described wealthy individuals who personally financed early 
Hollywood films. 
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considered “unsophisticated” by VCs, who take over when startups grow and 
require bigger capital. 
 
Table 1a: Early-stage impact investors  
Name Professional background Sample impact investments 
(self-defined) 




relations at large phar-
maceutical company 
(1) local fruit wine brewer; 
residential solar marketing 
company, (3) platform for 





neur, real estate devel-
oper, and mortgage-
backed securities 
(1) startup app to help 
businesses track social 
impact metrics; (2) loan 
fund to help poor youth 









ships in urban land 
redevelopment 
In Rwanda & Kenya: (1) 
biofuel-from-human-waste 
business, (2) wholesaler of 
crops from small farms; (3) 
drinking water distributor 
Concessionary (im-
pact-first) 
Marco Quantitative finance for 
hedge fund 
multiple local agriculture 




Table 1b: Intermediaries 




San Diego-based, with 
national scope. Founded in 
2010 
Initially ranked social businesses. Transitioned to 
providing best practices and “convening” high-
level employees to encourage corporate pursuit 
of social impact 
Impact Invest-





ed in 2013 
“Ecosystem” building. Encourages new impact 





Southern California chapter 
of federated international 
organization 
Brings together wealthy individuals at private 
gatherings to encourage investment in local 
food and agriculture businesses 
 
Table 1c: Impact investment firms 




ment firm with HNWIs and 
foundations as clients, 
based in San Francisco 
Asset classes range from stocks indexes to 






Mid-sized venture capital 
firm, founded 2010 
Invests in technology-based startups which it 
deems to be “world-positive,” distancing itself 
from the “impact” label. No rating system 
 
The recent presence of impact investors in San Diego is due to the city’s active 
conventional investor network, which emerged in tandem with its strong tech-
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nology and biotechnology sector – itself the outcome of decades of military 
contracts and government funding tied to research universities (Walshok and 
Shragge 2013). The commercial potential of that research spurred the devel-
opment of a network of early-stage (“angel”) and VC (later-stage) investors. 
Over the past two decades, as the cost of launching a startup has dropped, the 
global VC sector has segmented. Professional VC firms have turned to mature 
and higher-value startups, opening new terrain for individuals who are not 
professional financiers to invest in the proliferating startups at the bottom. This 
transformation is enabled in particular by the growth in high net worth individ-
uals,3 who find here a wide-open field to engage in an exciting activity – to 
wield a bit of influence, offer advice, and get close to the apparent heartbeat of 
innovation. Thus, despite their low station in the pantheon of finance, the angel 
i.e., early-stage investor is a social role which is presently becoming general-
ized, making it a particularly relevant object of analysis (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Category map of investors examined in this article 
 
2.  Social Value Metrics and the Places They Don’t Work 
This section first maps the rationale of impact metrics, which are intended to 
signal to impact-maximizing market actors. Yet in practice, it shows, these 
actors do not always respond to the information as rationally as imagined. For 
early-stage enterprises whose projects are not yet ready to be measured, inves-
tors rely on affect and embodied judgments to make sense of their activities as 
socially oriented. They learn to do so, and to recognize and affirm each other, 
in a community of practice. 
 
3  The Securities and Exchange Commission designation requires individuals to have an annual 
income above $200,000, or a net worth of more than $1 million, to invest in private com-
panies such as startups. Between 1982 and 2015, according to SEC data, the number of “ac-
credited investor” households increased tenfold, from 1.5 million to 16 million (Eaglesham 
et al. 2018). 
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2.1  Social Value Metrics as a Market Signal 
In relation to the lineage of projects to make capitalism more “caring,” includ-
ing Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), promoters of impact investing distinguish it by the mandate to quantify 
and measure the non-financial, i.e., social value or “impact,” that firms pro-
duce.4 At least this is how it has been defined since The Rockefeller Founda-
tion convened high-profile philanthropic, finance, and corporate actors in 2011 
to create the Global Impact Investment Rating System (GIIRS), a standard to 
measure the “social value” produced by corporations (Barman 2016). GIIRS is 
not an epistemological undertaking. Its purpose is not fundamentally to assert 
the truth that certain qualities measured count as “social value.” Its founders 
have a more pragmatic aim: a rating system, by establishing equivalency be-
tween diverse forms of social value, should create an efficient market which 
will direct capital to those who produce it best. The argument for metrics, then, 
cashes out in terms of fostering growth of the most effective social businesses.5  
Social value metrics are intended for use by institutional investors: financial 
professionals investing large pools of capital on behalf of, e.g., pension funds 
and wealthy individuals. An industry of consultants has emerged to do this 
work of quantifying businesses’ social interventions. Ethnographers have pro-
vided accounts of how such rating labor gets done: by “value entrepreneurs” 
(Barman 2016) based in offices, reading reports, working with statistics, and 
translating techniques from financial valuation (Archer 2018). But three 
tendencies of practice challenge the narrative that these metrics, once generat-
ed, unproblematically disseminate information to rational investors who com-
pare products prior to deploying capital: (1) despite attempts to unify the im-
pact market with shared judgment practices (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017), 
multiple and competing rating systems have been introduced – not only by 
market intermediaries like GIIRS, but also by private funds – leading to an 
“arms race,” as one fund manager put it, which negates the raison d’être of a 
common standard; (2) several of my informants suggested that anyway, many 
investors do not attend closely to quantified ratings because they come already 
committed to a particular social program, and (3) despite the existence of these 
rating systems – or perhaps as their very outcome – “greenwashed” finance 
products have made it to market: BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, 
launched its Impact US Equities Fund, whose “Schedule of Investments” lists 
mining companies, major banks, and Domino’s Pizza (BlackRock 2019). To-
 
4  This differs from “Social Return on Investment,” an accounting methodology whose metric 
is not social impact, but money; it measures social impact indirectly by monetizing estimat-
ed benefits (Hall et al. 2015). 
5  Social impact is also not equivalent to the “social enterprise” movement that emerged from 
the Harvard Business School in the 1990s: the latter taught business methodologies to non-
profit organizations (Barman 2016, 63). 
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gether, these tendencies suggest that corporate social responsibility officers, 
rating intermediaries, and impact fund managers may form a self-contained 
circuit – producing, assessing, and consuming metrics – detached from the 
concrete work of the enterprises being rated. Indeed, such a situation has char-
acterized the roll-out of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). Interest in this new “pay-
for-success” instrument for privately funding social services with government 
reimbursement comes not from lustful financiers scouring for unconventional 
investment opportunities. Rather, “the primary advocates of this model have 
been a diverse group of professional consultants and advisors” (Williams 
2018). The various ways metrics fall short of the ideal of efficient market in-
formation point to the lacuna in studying financialization of social activities 
exclusively through the lens of institutional actors and their market devices. 
As the field of institutional impact investing has congealed, it has inspired 
the small, independent investors who are the subjects of this article to orient 
their practice toward social activities. Although these early-stage investors do 
not employ impact metrics, they identify with the “impact” label, and listen in 
on that discursive universe: they read impact investing blogs and news sites, 
and attend its conferences. The next section elaborates how they recognize a 
“social” investment, and in so doing, recognize themselves as impact investors. 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), accounting for the ideological success of Ford-
ist-era capitalism in securing the consent of its cadres, propose that an abstract 
justification based on the societal virtues of the free market did not itself moti-
vate managers to go to work in regimented firms each morning. Similarly, I 
suggest, the rationale that quantification yields efficient (impactful) capital 
allocation may animate intermediaries like the Rockefeller Foundation who 
take a market-level perspective – but such an abstraction would not motivate 
early-stage impact investors, who instead relate affectively to their financial 
practice. 
2.2  The Self as Somatic Barometer for Social Value 
This section exhibits two forms of judging social value more fit than impact 
metrics for early-stage or “direct” investing, i.e., unmediated by financial insti-
tutions and markets. But before examining how these investors select impact 
startups and assess their progress, we should examine their capacity to know in 
this regard. For many, what authorizes oneself to become a valid judge of so-
cial value is undergoing a conversion they call an “a-ha! moment.” Here the 
term refers not to a scientific insight, but to an ethical one. Frequently striking 
after a career in the private sector, it ties together a desire to do good via one’s 
wealth, with the conviction that entrepreneurship – and not philanthropy – is 
the most effective means. At conferences and in publications central to the 
diffusion of impact investing, speakers frequently narrate their own a-ha mo-
ment, in a performative act which is crucial to making real their new hybrid 
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financial identity. For some, a personal crisis triggers the reorientation. Fred, 
the manager of boutique impact investment firm Segel Capital, presenting to a 
group of local philanthropists, introduced himself and his colleagues as “refu-
gees from financial services.” After reciting their pedigrees (one, a trader at 
Deutsche Bank; another, portfolio construction at Bank of America), he re-
counted his own cancer diagnosis: “it changed my outlook on my professional 
life. I thought about my skills, and what I could do with them [...] and found 
Segel, a perfect marriage of helping the world and my professional back-
ground.” Thus while upholding a continuity of expertise with conventional 
finance, he simultaneously broke with its (non-)ethical orientation – and, evan-
gelizing, implied his audience could do likewise.  
For others, the a-ha moment was triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. 
Marco Vangelisti is a spokesperson for Slow Money, which helps its global 
members invest in their local food economies. In a TED talk, keynote address-
es, and blog posts, he recounts how he worked for decades at a “glamorous” 
investment job while also identifying as a committed environmentalist. The 
highest performing company in the portfolio he managed also destroyed rain-
forests, and, in 2008, he says, “the cognitive dissonance became too great to 
ignore.” First, he left his job. Then, he divested his personal assets from all 
conventional financial securities, and reinvested in local businesses whose 
effects he could directly perceive. Addressing his audience, Vangelisti layers 
an emotional appeal on top of financial advice, stressing that one must learn to 
“overcome concerns” and be comfortable when one’s assets are no longer 
globally diversified and entrusted to big institutions (Vangelisti 2017). Thus the 
a-ha moment, by transforming one’s emotional relation to risk, helps reimagine 
what a financial technique can do. 
Having undergone this performative transformation, how do investors judge 
when an investment counts as impact? In lieu of rating systems, they may rely 
on sensations of physical and moral wellness to affirm that they are engaging 
with the right kind of startup. Mai was a corporate investor relations manager, 
retired early, and began to build a portfolio of equity in conventional startups in 
San Diego. Several years ago, one of these investments went bad. In the midst 
of being sued, Mai told me candidly, she developed a stress-induced facial tick. 
A psychologist encouraged her to “shift a bit of [her] investment effort and do 
something good for the world.” She had recently met an entrepreneur pitching 
a for-profit software platform for anonymous sexual assault reporting. So, 
passing the psychologist’s advice through her professional habitus, she called 
up the entrepreneur and committed to invest. Her facial tick disappeared that 
afternoon. “I just want to support what he’s doing,” Mai told me. “I said, ‘I’m 
here as a sounding board for you – call me any time you want; we’ll meet for 
coffee.’” Investment bankers, too, may speak of moral fulfillment derived from 
pro bono work managing an impact fund (Bourgeron 2016). But they are of-
fice-bound, supplying capital in absentia from the enterprise. Mai’s sensuous 
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form of judging, in contrast, depends on mentorship relations with her inves-
tees unmediated by markets and rating systems.  
Samuel judges impact in a different affective register. After successful ca-
reers in software entrepreneurship and then mortgage-backed securities, he 
chose to enhance his annual philanthropic giving by mentoring a foster care 
teenager. He volunteered at a nonprofit organization to which he also donates 
money, Youth Mentoring Network (YMN). The relationship between Samuel 
and the teen progressed from gifts of commodities (taking him shopping at 
Walmart) to the sharing of social capital (introductions to his professional 
network). “What’s interesting is that I wound up becoming a better father for 
my own kids as a result of getting involved,” Samuel reflected. And this trans-
formation ramified beyond his own domestic relations. Normally, in such vol-
unteer work, the nonprofit organization coordinates activity but is not itself 
fundamentally changed. But in this case, Samuel, significantly moved by his 
experience, began a multi-year effort to inject techniques of corporate finance 
into YMN’s operations, enabling it to leverage private capital (see 3.3) – thus 
collapsing charity work into finance. 
2.3  Ecosystem (As Evangelizer), Not Market (As Allocator) 
A-ha moments and somatic experiences do not strike individuals in isolation, 
but are modeled by peers and reinforced through narration at gatherings within 
the “ecosystem,” a metaphor borrowed from the conventional startup sector. 
The ecosystem encompasses amateur and professional investors, social busi-
nesses, financial lawyers, and other intermediaries, and as metaphor, indicates 
their interdependency. Metrics, as an ideal, supply information to buyers of 
investment goods on an anonymous market. The ecosystem, in contrast, is 
social machinery for converting individuals into impact investors, providing 
affirmation through community. My informants see San Diego’s impact eco-
system as lacking in critical mass. Building it requires networking labor, which 
is affective as much as organizational. When Naomi of local intermediary IISD 
(see Table 1) returned from SoCap, the premiere North American impact in-
vesting conference, she held a webinar to debrief IISD’s investor-members. 
After summarizing, she played a video clip from a conference keynote by a 
social activist poet. Someone on the webinar, echoing the poet’s words, asked 
how she herself might “help more people to lead with their heart rather than 
their spreadsheets.” Naomi replied by conscripting everyone listening into the 
project of ecosystem building: “convene small learning circles […] invest in 
individual conversations […] it’s a long process.”  
Beyond generic networking events, ecosystems congeal through “conven-
ings,” a recent business locution denoting meetings of influential individuals 
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and a targeted agenda.6 Inflection Point is an impact intermediary formed in 
San Diego by a disillusioned young business consultant, originally to profile 
and rate “[social] purpose-driven businesses” internationally. But after several 
years, the founder, Nicholas, saw that this strategy, implicitly relying on the 
ideal of efficient market information, was not effective. “I’ve pivoted,” he said. 
“My focus is now finding people inside those companies who want to change 
dynamics in the economy – doing high level convening, helping those people 
trust each other, and then sharing the wisdom.” This approach facilitates  
financialization not in the manner of a market device like a metric, but indirect-
ly, via affective and relational work. The networking labor of “convening” and 
inspiring executives to make social and environmental activities constitutively 
part of normal operations helps their companies become legible to institutional 
impact funds and rating systems.  
3.  Venture Capital Methods Influence and Undermine the 
Pursuit of Impact 
On the one hand, early-stage impact investors look to affective experience 
rather than quantified indicators, the latter being one tool by which finance 
reaches into new domains. However, these investors employ an alternative 
technique of financialization: they construe value always in terms of future 
revenue potential (Chiapello 2015, 17). This is visible in their concern for 
assessing and selecting businesses bent on rapid expansion, in their adherence 
to contracts structured to multiply their capital, and as they discipline entrepre-
neurs toward these ends. 
3.1  Commercial Success as a Gauge of Social Value Production 
The early-stage impact investor will encounter many entrepreneurs who prom-
ise to produce social value; discerning which are good investments draws on 
their prior experience with conventional finance. Venture capital methodology 
foregrounds a sensitivity to character virtues of entrepreneurs rather than to the 
product itself (cf. Shapin 2009, 270), and an orientation toward the potential for 
exponential growth. Thus while Mai hoped that the sexual assault reporting app 
“could bring justice to the corporate world” (see 2.2), she simultaneously 
brainstormed how it might “monetize” its users: perhaps inviting lawyers to 
advertise their services, or providing sexual assault prevention education to 
businesses. Here she invoked the centerpiece of VC logic: “I was interested in 
 
6  The term is preferred by the Trump administration: “First Lady Convenes Tech Companies to 
Tackle Cyberbullying” (The New York Times March 3, 2018). 
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[the entrepreneur] because he’s scalable – it’s a technology database with a 
marketing platform.” Mai harmonized a judgment of impact by her facial tick 
(see 2.2), with a judgment of value by the potential for quick growth. 
When an investor has become sufficiently intrigued by an entrepreneur’s 
pitch, the parties enter due diligence, a process of verifying the latter’s claims, 
such as employment history, patents obtained, and projected demand. Precisely 
because this procedure is native to conventional investing, impact investors 
emphasize that they conduct rigorous “diligence,” to distinguish their practice 
as finance and not philanthropy. Thus Fred, presenting Segel Capital’s impact 
fund (see 2.2), insisted that they “approach every investment with a healthy 
level of cynicism: it has to work as a business.” Informants repeatedly stressed 
that “diligencing” an impact deal follows a process equally narrow in financial 
scope to that for non-impact deals. It involves legal searches to ascertain 
whether the corporation is properly formed, has a governance structure amena-
ble to investors, and has bank accounts with established credit. One interviewee 
characterized Slow Money (see 2.2) as “a group of beginners who need [con-
ventional investors] with experience, willing to do the diligence work.” Lack-
ing such expertise, they partnered with a private lender to conduct due dili-
gence and service their loans to local food businesses. Diligence, then, is an 
epistemic procedure that bridges moments of affective judgment into financial 
circulation. 
Once an early-stage investor believes she has selected a business where so-
cial benefit is constitutively “baked in” to the product, then financial success 
becomes a proxy for social value. Indeed the ideal impact investor habitus 
fuses these two sensitivities to social and financial potential. Thus when asked 
by a presentation attendee whether Segel Capital identifies investible compa-
nies by first considering social impact, and then financial viability of the busi-
ness, or vice versa, Fred claimed not to differentiate between the two – while in 
the same breath, insisting they prioritize financial soundness when selecting. 
This quasi-contradiction is made to disappear through a means-ends criterion 
which holds social mission to be folly if the business is unsustainable financial-
ly. Taken to the extreme, this logic negates impact’s categorial specificity: 
socially oriented venture capital firm Obvious Ventures has banned the “i-
word,” as their director Joaquin refers to impact, because they believe clients, 
whose money they invest, associate the term with “concessionary” capital 
(lower returns in exchange for impact). Instead, they call themselves “world-
positive investors.” Joaquin says defiantly: “We don’t measure social impact. 
EBITDA [revenue] is our measurement – you don’t need a separate measure-
ment.”7 But if revenue is a necessary qualifier, it is not sufficient: when pushed 
 
7  EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization) is a proxy for reve-
nue. It is used by venture capitalists to value startups which have not yet generated reve-
nue. 
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on the point in an interview, Joaquin conceded that their analysts present re-
search on potential investments to the fund’s partners, who decide intuitively 
which are “world-positive.” These equivocations between social and financial 
value are not disingenuous, but rather point to the historical contingency of the 
categories; even the idea that “value” means “future earning power” has not 
always been natural, but was the object of pedagogical labor in early 20th cen-
tury business schools (Muniesa 2016).  
3.2  Varieties of Contract Forms and How They Prioritize Financial 
Returns 
Impact investors take contractual forms seriously, even when committing capi-
tal to “concessionary” projects where below-market returns are likely. Robert 
of Solana Ventures is a former city planner who inherited money. In his retire-
ment, he wanted to make the world better using expertise he had acquired fi-
nancing urban industrial zones (see 1.1). He is discerning in which countries he 
selects, but not based on impact need. Although Robert does not say he oper-
ates exclusively in “capitalist” environments, he articulated this choice more 
subtly and precisely: he loans out his capital only in countries with independent 
judiciaries which “respect the rights of investors” – that is, the property rights 
in money. For the Kenya biofuels investment, he and two co-investors formed a 
Delaware LLC8 to purchase shares in the Kenyan subsidiary. This afforded tax 
benefits, and legal protection for their other personal assets. It also enabled one 
investor to easily sell his equity to a third party when he wanted capital for a 
different investment. Even when not undertaken for personal enrichment, im-
pact investments remain fundamentally instruments for circulating and growing 
capital. “I want to be able to keep recycling [i.e., reinvesting] the money,” 
Robert says. “When I’m in a wheelchair, then I’ll just give it away.” Were he 
doing philanthropy, neither the LLC nor the stipulation that courts uphold 
contracts would be relevant. While Robert knows a social impact investment by 
gut feel (see 1.1), he “financializes” by spreading western norms of contractual 
engagement.  
Though firms may enter into a relationship with investors in various ways 
(e.g., by issuing a bond – essentially a loan), direct investments in social enter-
prises typically default to the sale of equity (ownership). This model has been 
normalized by venture capitalists over decades of financing conventional 
startups. Equity is risky for investors, who are repaid last (after creditors) if the 
startup fails, a statistically likely outcome. But if the startup grows, investors 
 
8  The U.S. state of Delaware has notoriously minimal corporate disclosure requirements and 
tax obligations. 
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can earn orders of magnitude more than a loan would yield,9 by selling their 
ownership. Some impact actors, however, argue that equity-based funding sets 
up incentives which conflict with the pursuit of social mission: equity inves-
tors, qua shareholders, participate in company governance, and may prioritize 
financial growth in order to make the company attractive to buyers. This may 
strain resources and cause neglect of social mission. As Nicholas of Inflection 
Point (see 2.3) saw it, eager young social entrepreneurs often accept an equity 
structure because it has been made familiar through copious how-to blogs, 
videos, and workshops directed at aspiring (conventional) entrepreneurs. “They 
raise a round [of financing] and give away equity; they burn through that and 
give away some more. Then down the line there’s this realization: ‘oh, how do 
we possibly deliver on that? We have to sell the company.’” Nicholas is haunt-
ed by the story of ecological soap company Seventh Generation. Despite regis-
tering as a Benefit Corporation – a new legal designation relaxing the fiduciary 
obligations required by equity financing (cf. Collins and Kahn 2016) – the 
company’s founder was forced out when resisted investor pressure to grow. 
The distrust of equity mirrors critiques of the shareholder value movement: it 
imposes on all decisions a short-term accounting logic (cf. Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). 
If intermediaries like Nicholas are suspicious of equity investors potentially 
“perverting” the relationship with entrepreneurs, these positions sometimes 
flip: “impact-first” i.e., concessionary investors may be more concerned than 
some entrepreneurs to design contracts which incentivize social return vis à vis 
financial return. In such cases, what assurances do impact-first investors have? 
Conventional early-stage contracts often specify quantifiable “milestones” for 
financial growth which are “not rough estimations […] but imperatives that 
must align with the investment’s […] valuation rational” (Muniesa et al. 2017, 
29). Unsurprisingly, then, those who reject social impact metrics dismiss the 
idea of contractually guaranteed impact “milestones.” As “pay-for-
performance” Social Impact Bonds in the public sector have demonstrated, 
isolating and assessing outcomes is always fraught, and ambiguities in assess-
ment methodology quickly blossom into economic and political disputes 
(Warner 2015). Obvious Ventures’ Joaquin bristled in an interview at the sug-
gestion of contractually binding entrepreneurs to produce social value; he relies 
instead on his intuition for selecting “[social] value-aligned” entrepreneurs, and 
he prospectively attributes any shortcomings to exogenous factors. However, 
he did not leave impact expectations entirely uncodified: in 2017, Obvious 
published on their blog a template for what they called a “World Positive Term 
Sheet.” Term sheets accompany VC contracts, specifying terms like the degree 
 
9  Venture capital’s emphasis on exponential growth is not simple greed, but a function of 
their portfolio strategy which spreads the investment fund across many startups. The total 
returns often derive from one outsized success which makes up for other losses. 
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of control ceded to investors. As a speculative exercise, Obvious added a cate-
gory of clauses pertaining to social impact: e.g., “We plan to make extra ef-
forts, at some extra initial cost, to remove hidden bias from our recruiting pro-
cess,” and “We have removed all plastic bottles from our office kitchen” 
(Joaquin 2017). While this publicity grab incorporates no mechanism of guar-
antee, it does aim to (gently) question norms about what belongs in the term 
sheet, the cardinal document of venture capital deals. 
Distrust of equity-based contracts and reluctance to set hard impact targets 
has renewed interest in a quotidian approach to financing in which the startup 
takes a loan, to be repaid out of operating profit. The model, termed revenue-
based financing (RBF), proposes to more closely “align” interests of the inves-
tor with the entrepreneur’s social mission. Investors receive a percentage of the 
enterprise’s revenue up to an agreed maximum gain on principal. But, Nicholas 
of Inflection Point stresses, RBF holds little appeal for investors habituated to 
equity deals, where each is a (risky) bet that “the company goes public and 
everyone makes like a hundred million dollars.” Nicholas laughed uncomforta-
bly. Even a highly successful RBF-funded enterprise will be less profitable to 
investors than if funded through equity. The RBF in an instrument which mate-
rializes a moral proposition: extract less value. The point is not that investors 
with “concessionary” inclinations are out there, waiting to be found. Rather, 
RBF advocates hope this contract structure will help provoke into being (Mu-
niesa 2014) a new kind of investor-subject.10 And they understand it will re-
quire supportive social context. At “convenings” (see 2.3), Nicholas and other 
intermediaries do the affective work of coaching both conventional investors 
and the philanthropically-inclined wealthy to re-frame their own norms about 
what an investment contract ought to look like. 
3.3  Affective Financialization: Deriving Satisfaction From 
Disciplining Entrepreneurs 
The impact investors and intermediaries profiled here seek to intervene in but 
also through the private enterprise system. As such, they aim to infuse social 
activities with skills and behaviors distilled from the world of conventional 
entrepreneurship, and they find satisfaction in doing so. Their work may be 
understood as disciplinary, in two senses: as policing divisions between do-
mains, and as cultivating mastery of a technique. Here, their disciplining targets 
two classes of actors: first, social entrepreneurs and nonprofit organizations, 
 
10  Of my informants, only Samuel has used an RBF in his own investment. Robert’s use of 
equity in his East Africa investments testifies to the cultural entanglements of venture capi-
tal financing (where equity is the norm) and entrepreneurial innovation as mechanism of 
national development (cf. Irani 2019). 
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and second, other funders – philanthropic donors and professional peers being 
(re)formed as nascent impact investors.  
As a direct investor into social enterprises in East Africa, Robert of Solana 
Ventures enjoys making first-order interventions, rather than pursuing his val-
ues vicariously through the intermediation of an impact investment fund. We 
might gloss his work as the disciplining of aspiring entrepreneurs. Traveling to 
small business conventions in the global south, he finds that many entrepre-
neurs’ business plans fall below standards for presenting to a commercial bank, 
and offers to coach them. “The entrepreneurs in those countries are not up to 
speed,” he says, “and you have to be patient.” Robert invests in the most prom-
ising ones, and provides what guidance he can from a distance. Although after 
five years, one of his eight portfolio companies is failing, and none have re-
turned principle, it would be incorrect to therefore call his practice philanthropy 
masquerading as investment. This distinction is performed through both stick 
and carrot. On the one hand, Robert is scrupulous in holding his investees to 
private-sector financial norms: “we loaned [one entrepreneur] $80,000 at 12%, 
which is about market rate. I don’t want to lend to him at a concessionary rate. 
I want him to think this is not donated money.” But he also assists his investees 
in performing competency. Consider that while early modern double-entry 
bookkeeping was rife with technical errors, merchants were nonetheless able to 
“take advantage of the legitimacy conferred on their activity by the practice of 
mathematical skills” (Chiapello 2007, 272; Carruthers and Espeland 1991). 
Robert, by coaching his investees to make their financial statements profes-
sionally presentable, enables them to signal their financial legitimacy. As he 
puts it, he is “exporting the American culture of entrepreneurship” – and de-
rives meaning and satisfaction from doing so. And in all this labor, Robert is 
doing one small part of prepping East Africa for the tentacles of bigger (im-
pact) capital to come. 
The second target of disciplines are philanthropists and socially-minded in-
vestors themselves. In rock-star Bono’s concise formulation, at a press confer-
ence announcing the $2 billion “Rise” impact fund by private equity firm TPG 
Growth, “there is a lazy-mindedness that we afford the do-gooders” (Sorkin 
2016). This statement reflects anxiety among impact promoters after an initial 
wave of ventures either failed to return money, or failed to create much meas-
urable impact – thus leaving them no claim to differentiation from either chari-
ty or conventional investments. The same moralizing attitude can be found 
even among early-stage investors who do not use metrics. At an entrepreneur-
ship conference I attended, a former research scientist and successful investor 
announced her new project, The Next Wave Impact Fund, a network of 100 
women jointly investing in social impact startups. “This is not not-for-profits,” 
she said, her voice rising in emphasis. “You can have social impact and actual-
ly make some money.” Indeed this rhetoric is two-tiered: professional impact 
investors impose disciplines on soft-hearted philanthropists to, in turn, disci-
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pline their investees. Thus in his presentation to San Diego philanthropists, 
Fred of Segel Capital explained that “it’s important in this space to have in-
vestment discipline […] and not fall in love with the narrative of a social entre-
preneur.” He emphasized that impact investors must assess the financial viabil-
ity of the business opportunity on its own terms. “People often say, ‘oh we love 
the entrepreneur so let’s just give him [sic] some money.’ But if they’re not 
running the enterprise well, they won’t be around in a year and it won’t make 
any impact.”  
Above, I described how Samuel, after mentoring a foster youth, pushed the 
nonprofit YMN to reconfigure its financial structure according to his own 
professional worldview (see 2.2). His experience running a $300 million mort-
gage fund and developing real estate taught him to integrate private capital with 
government funding (homeownership subsidies). With this knowledge of 
“blended capital stacks,” he guided YMN to establish a “creative auto[mobile] 
financing” loan for youth in their program. Previously, the nonprofit had solic-
ited donations to subsidize youth who took market-rate car loans from a private 
lender. Samuel recounts: “I said ‘why don’t we get a bank involved, and get 
some leverage.’ [YMN staff] said, ‘ooh, what?’” His proposal exceeded both 
their technical familiarity, and their norms about which financial instruments a 
nonprofit ought to use. But, he convinced them, and engineered a loan pool 
from three sources of capital: (1) the nonprofit YMN; (2) local impact inves-
tors; and (3) a private bank. Initially, the bank had been unwilling to loan to the 
youth at less than 16%, even with YMN contributing collateral. But with sever-
al impact investors supplying an extra layer of risk protection, the bank agreed 
to lower terms, and lent at a leveraged rate of 3:1 – making available three 
times as much capital for loans as YMN and the impact investors contributed. 
Achieving this required affective, relational labor: “it was a freaking night-
mare,” Samuel said. “With a nonprofit, you have to deal with the board of 
directors. Then the board wants to funnel it off to a committee; the committee’s 
gotta consult with the subcommittee. That deal took two years to put together. 
If I were doing it privately, I’d have had it done in three months.” Organiza-
tional culture stood as a barrier between a conventional state and a financial-
ized state of the nonprofit, which Samuel carried the knowledge and the will to 
overcome. The deal counted as “impact” for him not only because it provided 
financing for an in-need constituency – automobility in a suburban environ-
ment makes marginalized youth employable, and thus affords class mobility – 
but also because it structurally transformed the nonprofit organization. Now, 
Samuel emphasized, the donations YMN received could be earmarked for 
those more purely philanthropic programs unable to leverage impact capital. 
But it also represents one of a thousand small cuts into the category barrier 
between finance and social services. 
“Blended” public-private financing is not new. I highlight the above case 
because it exemplifies a will to financialize which is reducible neither to the 
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altruistic pleasure of helping in-need populations, nor to monetary gain cap-
tured through financial intermediation (cf. Golka 2019). Samuel evinced a 
profound affective satisfaction in herding the staff and board members of a 
traditional nonprofit toward the orbit of private finance. Though their pace 
frustrated him, it simultaneously presented an enjoyable challenge for his pro-
fessional identity and skills – and the social impact only sharpened, but did not 
fundamentally underlie, that pleasure. Samuel has also made three investments 
himself which he characterized as “impact.” One involved an entrepreneur 
developing an app to help companies track their social value metrics. She had a 
PhD in information management, and had previously worked for nonprofits. 
Samuel was initially reluctant to invest because the entrepreneur had offered 
him equity (high risk, high potential return), while Samuel wanted a secured 
loan.  
I said to her “Look I’m not going to fund a startup, but if you want to take a 
loan on your house, I’ll tell you what – I’ll write you a creative note [the loan 
document]. I’ll give you a low interest rate as long as you’re working on the 
app; if you decide to end it, it goes back to market rate.” And that’s actually 
what happened. She worked on it for two years. She wound up selling the 
code to someone, but didn’t get enough to return my loan. And now she just 
makes payments. She’s refinancing her house and she’ll pay me off. So my 
exit was – I wasn’t looking for a big win. It was fairly low risk for me, be-
cause she had enough equity in the house. 
It is notable here that Samuel did not choose to forgive the loan. He is wealthy, 
and the loss would not have materially impacted him. Samuel evinced no moral 
ambiguity telling the story; to the contrary, he was self-satisfied that the failed 
impact investment had not retroactively become a donation. His response ex-
emplifies the pleasure of imposing financial disciplines. This is not masochism, 
but rather derives both from his reverence for the risks of entrepreneurship, 
however they may fall, and from exercising the white-collar skills which he 
had developed over his career as a capitalist. Samuel’s practices count as a 
particular version, and vision, of financialization: not the creation of markets 
for social activities, but the creation of entrepreneurs out of individuals who 
were previously subjects of need, recipients of handouts. And a similar trans-
formation marked his work with YMN: nonprofit managers no longer rely 
exclusively on donations, but are made attuned to the affordances of financial 
intermediation. 
4.  Conclusion 
This article began from the consensus among researchers that social activities – 
conventionally the domain of governments and NGOs – are undergoing finan-
cialization, and becoming terrain for “social impact” investment. One inquiry 
into this transformation has focused on how social impact gets quantified and 
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rated, allowing the underlying activities to be capitalized and traded – and, 
presumably, altered in the process. I have shown how this quantifying approach 
to appraising social impact is not suited for the domain of startup investing. 
One reason is pragmatic: startups have not yet produced anything to measure. 
The other concerns the way these early-stage investors make sense of and nar-
rate their activity. They come to know “impact” through embodied and affec-
tive evaluation, by working directly with their investees, and within a commu-
nity of peer investors. Simultaneously, however, they adhere to conventional 
investment techniques aimed at the growth of the business and of their own 
capital. This hybridizing of cultural repertoires, I have shown, interpellates 
individuals with diverse professional backgrounds as impact investors. 
The independent investors described in this article deploy relatively small 
amounts of capital without sophisticated mathematical methods, and so may 
appear inconsequential in comparison to billion-dollar impact funds. But the 
financialization of social activities involves not only capture and redirection of 
monetary resources by large, institutional financial actors. I have argued that it 
also involves these smaller actors who, by spreading entrepreneurial disci-
plines, prepare new tracts of human activity for institutional investors further 
up the chain of intermediation. “Financialization,” then, should be understood 
as a society-wide process which encompasses distinct moments: both those 
dominated by the affective modes I have analyzed, as well those based on 
quantitative and probabilistic techniques native to high finance, foregrounded 
by other scholarship. Like the history of another financial innovation, insur-
ance, which can be told both as Swiss farmers pledging mutual support in case 
of loss, and as gamblers near London wharfs betting on ships’ returns (Albert 
1993, 87) – this article has offered, a supplementary strand in the genealogy of 
the emerging practice of impact investing. 
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